sentry.toml: The Deployment Configuration¶
Argus Sentry reads one annotated configuration file, sentry.toml. The file
is the single source a deployment edits. The loader,
argus_sentry.config.load_config, parses it with the Python standard
library's TOML reader and builds the typed objects the shipped components
consume. One annotated copy ships inside the package with every key
documented: its type, its default, and the component that consumes it.
The loader is wire-through only. It constructs the shipped components with their existing signatures and changes no behavior.
The fail-closed load contract¶
Validation happens at load, before the boundary accepts a single call. A configuration that does not parse clean never starts.
| Condition | Result |
|---|---|
| Unknown key in any section | ConfigKeyError naming the key; load fails |
| Malformed value | ConfigTypeError naming the key and the expected type |
| Missing key type in a key reference | ConfigError; the two accepted forms are named in the message |
| Inline key material | ConfigError: key material is never inlined |
| Referenced policy file does not exist | ConfigError; load fails |
| Referenced key file unreadable, empty, or not 32 bytes of hex | ConfigError naming the file |
| Referenced environment variable unset | ConfigError naming the variable |
An unknown key is a rejected deployment, not a warning. A typo in a key name cannot silently fall back to a default.
Key material is referenced, never inlined¶
Every key entry names a source. The material itself resolves at build time and never appears in the configuration:
Inline material is rejected at parse time:
The error names the two accepted forms. This holds for every key entry in the file: the issuer seed, the chain record key, the load authority key, the host attestation key, and the policy trust anchor.
The sections¶
| Section | The deployment decides | Notes |
|---|---|---|
[deployment] |
Form (embedded / sidecar / sharded), server id, audience, listener, shard worker count |
The audience is the token audience executors verify; both ends must agree |
[policy] |
Policy path, trusted signer id, signer verify key | Paths resolve against the file's directory; the policy file must exist at load |
[issuer] |
Token mode (ed25519 / session-hmac), key id, epoch, TTL, signing key |
Key ids from 0x8000 up are the reserved session range and are rejected |
[session] |
Session TTL, action-class scope, target bounds, token limits | Applies in session-HMAC mode; a session states its grant or assembly refuses |
[executor] |
Amount pointer, clock skew, replay store sizing | The amount pointer is where monetary limits read the action amount |
[evidence] |
Recorder contract (auto / native / reference), inline or async, batch size, chain keys |
Batch size 2 to 4096 anchors one signed record per batch |
[retention] |
Record classes, dispositions, mode (worm / audit-trail) |
Unmapped classes are never dispositioned |
[oversight] |
Hold-queue capacity and TTL | A full queue leaves denials standing; an expired hold never approves |
[model] |
Model identity and version pin | Both fields, or none; a deployment that pins none records the absence |
[engine] |
Engine binding demand (auto / native / reference) |
native feeds the health readiness gate |
[host] |
Host attestation key | Signs every proposal's host attestation and each batch root |
[metrics] |
Metrics hook, ring capacity, profile label | Off by default |
What the load verifies beyond shape¶
The policy named in [policy] must carry a valid Ed25519 signature over its
canonical signed range, verified against the trust anchor named by signer
and anchor. An unsigned policy, a signature from an untrusted key, or any
post-signature edit fails closed before a single call is evaluated.
In session-HMAC mode the session must state its grant: a list of target
patterns, or an explicit unrestricted = true. A configuration with neither
refuses to assemble.
See Packaging and Health Readiness for the install path and the readiness gate that checks the configuration's demands at runtime.